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  Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the question whether CBI is an appropriate monetary institution for transition 
economies to change inflation dynamics and foster the transition process to a stable and efficient market 
economy. In this respect, we provide theoretical arguments and find empirical evidence. The time-series 
empirical approach used to determine the most likely date for the change in regime was based on Perron 
(1997), where the null hypothesis of a unit root is set against the alternative of stationarity about a single 
broken trend. The empirical results lead to the conclusion that the process of decontrol of domestic prices 
(or price liberalization) has a significant positive impact on inflation persistence in transition countries. 
However, in the presence of controls, there is no evidence to support conventional wisdom regarding the 
negative relation between CBI and inflation persistence.  A reason for this conclusion is that such CBI is 
instrumental in reducing inflation persistence only when other structural features of the economy, such as 
the price liberalization, have become sufficiently and persistently similar to those of developed market 
economies. Consequently, in a period of severe macroeconomic imbalances, CBI doesn’t seem to be an 
institutional arrangement effective to stabilize the economy. 
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       1.  Introduction  
 
During the last decade all Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries created completely 
new Central Bank (CB) laws, or reformed existing laws, at least once and sometime twice 
(Cukierman et al., 2002). In all these countries the new CB laws contain at least basic 
provisions for Central Bank Independence (CBI) and the average level of independence is 
high.  The main factor motivating behind this central banks reform has been the belief that 
monetary policy lead to the famous dynamic inconsistency problem that arises when the 
optimal policy before the private agent’s contracts are set is different from the optimal policy 
afterwards (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983). In this context, delegating 
monetary policy to an independent central banker (Rogoff, 1985) may be an institutional 
mechanism intended to mitigate the time inconsistency problem and increase the credibility 
of policymakers’ commitments to stable prices.  
There is now a wide consensus among economists that, at least in industrial economies, 
central banks should be independent. However, the question is whether this argument can 
automatically be transferred to CEE countries as well. In this paper we concentrate on the 
following question. Is central bank independence an appropriate monetary institution for 
transition economies to change inflation dynamics and foster the transition process to a stable 
and efficient market economy, or does it trend to lead to counter-productive effects?  
 Indeed, monetary policy framework reform in CEE countries includes a new definition 
of the role of monetary policy, which implies main structural changes with respect to 
institutional, strategic and instrumental aspects. Transforming such centrally planned 
economies into market-oriented economies, and thus trying to use monetary policy as an 
instrument for macroeconomic stabilization, changed its character fundamentally. It implied a 
switch from a complete accommodating to a non-accommodating policy (Wagner, 1999). On 
the other hand, specific features of transition economies may distort the influence of the 
                                                                                    1independence of central bank on inflation performance (Cukierman 1996).  The initial stage 
of economic transformation was characterised by severe macroeconomic imbalances. Price 
liberalisation and devaluation of the currency, combined with an initial monetary overhang, 
produced substantial shocks to inflation. Although newly established central banks were 
generally provided with a considerable degree of statutory independence, the legal 
framework varies considerably from country to country and over time. Weak constraints on 
the amount of credit granted to the government significantly reduce central banks' ability to 
conduct independent monetary policy. Finally, the CEE countries quickly opened up their 
economies, running large deficits financed by borrowing from international institutions and, 
when they regained confidence, at financial markets. High deficits, combined with low level 
of international reserves and fragility of domestic financial systems make them highly 
vulnerable to balance of payments crises. Thus, macroeconomic imbalances, credit-hungry 
governments and underdeveloped financial systems produce an environment in which central 
bank independence is thoroughly tested. 
In this context, the Central Bank reform in the transition experience of CEE countries 
provides a unique opportunity to examine the relationship between CBI and the inflation 
dynamics in environments with major structural changes and high inflation rates.  Early 
attempts to explore the question of CBI in post-communist states started from descriptive 
studies by Hinton-Braaten (1994), Hochreiter (1994) and Hochreiter and Riesinger (1995). 
Sundararajan et al. (1997), following the same approach discuss CB reforms in former Soviet 
Union and Radzyner and Riesinger (1997) present an extensive review of central bank legal 
independence in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Siklos 
(1994) constructs the first index of legal independence for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovak Republic. This index is based on the Cukierman et al's (1992) methodology, but 
introduces some additional elements specific to transition economies. Eijffinger and Van 
                                                                                    2Keulen (1995) investigate also the new CB laws of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland by 
presenting several indices of political independence for a broader group of eleven countries. 
Loungani and Sheets (1997) examine CBI in twelve post-communist countries by deriving 
two indices of CBI. The first covers goal, economic and political independence and the 
second assess similarity between the analysed law and the Bundesbank statute. A strong 
negative correlation between the measures of independence and the 1993 inflation rate 
emerges, even after controlling for fiscal performance and the overall reform progress.  
More recently, Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002) present the most comprehensive 
study on CBI in transition economies to date. The authors construct CB independence index 
based on Cukierman et al's (1992) methodology for 26 post-communist economies, 
accounting for some recent changes in the laws. The main finding of the Cukierman et al. 
(2002) study is that CBI is negatively related to inflation only at a sufficiently high and 
sustained level of economic liberalisation. Thus, the CBI cannot protect economies from 
inflationary consequences of the powerful inflationary shocks experienced at the early stage 
of transformation. These findings are consistent with a recent study of de Melo, Denizer and 
Gelb (1996) who also reports that inflation is lower in transition economies with a higher 
level of sustained liberalization. Thus even high central bank independence cannot contain 
the initial powerful inflationary impact of price decontrols. But once the process of 
liberalization has gathered sufficient momentum legal independence become effective in 
reducing inflation. This finding may appear surprising, but in some cases after the enactment 
of Central Bank law most CEE economies experienced high and variable inflation.  
This raises an important question. Why should CBI be more effective in containing 
inflation at higher than at lower levels of cumulative liberalization? To answer at this 
question, most existing studies on inflation and CBI are basically cross-sectional (see 
Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti, 2002). Indeed, this purely cross sectional focus is dictated by 
                                                                                    3the absence of meaningful temporal variation in existing measures of legal CBI. But in the 
case of transition economies there were, during the early 1990s, dramatic changes in CBI 
within all the countries concerned. This raises two additional and related questions. Did the 
enactment of new CB laws have a noticeable effect on inflation?  And was the decrease in 
inflation bigger in countries that experienced a larger increase in the independence of their 
Central Banks? These questions can be answered by utilizing the cross-country variation, as 
well as the over time variation in CBI. The intention of the paper is twofold: Firstly we 
formulate a theoretical model in which we analyse the effects of central bank independence 
on inflation dynamics (or persistence) in transition countries. Secondly, we explore 
empirically, in a time-series context whether and how the CBI in transition countries affected 
the degree of inflation persistence in these countries. In this respect, we focus on changes in 
the policy regime (central bank reform) as phenomena that lead to shifts in the degree of 
inflation persistence in these countries. The technique used in this paper tests for one or more 
discrete shifts in the inflation process occurring at unknown dates, using some time series 
statistical tests. It consists of testing for an unknown break point in a time series and it is 
based upon the recently advanced work by Perron (1997), which proposes a series of tests 
where the null hypothesis of a unit root is set against the alternative of stationarity about a 
single broken trend line. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical 
framework. Section 3 analyses the effects of the intensity of liberalizing internal (output) 
markets on the inflation persistence (or inflation dynamics) in transition countries and takes a 
deeper look at the potential existence of an interaction between independence of central bank 
and the price liberalization. Section 5 presents the econometric methodology and empirical 
results. Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the paper. 
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2. The Theoretical Framework 
 
This section provides a simple monetary policy game model to frame our analysis in the 
context of a transition economy. We consider a Barro-Gordon (1983) type of model extended 
to allow for persistent stochastic output shocks and indexed wage contracts (Gray, 1976; 
Fischer, 1983) in order to capture the extent of liberalization respectively in output and labour 
markets. Capital will be assumed fixed in the short-run, and output is given by the short-run 
production function1: 
     t t t l y θ α + =    ,    1 0 < <α     (1) 
where   is the log of output, l  is the log of employment, and  t y t t θ  is a measure of 
productivity shocks assumed to follow the process: 
      t t t ε φθ θ + = −1  ,               1 0 ≤ ≤φ           (2) 
where  φ  is the degree of autocorrelation in output random shocks and  t ε  is a normally 
distributed random variable with zero mean and a variance varying with φ  so as to 
standardize the variance of  t θ  at  , that is  . The specification of the 
way in which shocks in output market evolve over time in equation (2) is motivated by the 
choice of a simple way to introduce the effects of price controls in output market in the 
former socialist economies (FSE), exerting thus an influence on the inertia of inflation. In this 
context, the autocorrelation coefficient 
2
θ σ ] ) 1 (   , 0 [  
2 2 I N t θ σ ξ ε − ≈
φ  shows that a random output shock is persistent and, 
since  t θ  depends on  1 − t θ , this shock will be transmitted forward in time generating an 
inflation persistence (see Bleaney, 2001). Firms decide on labour demand and output by 
                                                           
1 The lower-case letters refer to logarithmic deviations from steady state variables. 
 
                                                                                    5maximizing their profits. They produce a homogenous good and stand in perfect competition. 
Hence labour demand is given by  
{ } t t t t t t t L t L Y L W Y P l
t
Θ = − =
α          max arg ln  
where capital letters denote the according non-logarithmic variables.   is the price level and 
 is the nominal wage. Firms produce a homogenous good and stand in perfect competition. 
Maximizing profits yields the labour demand function: 
i P
i W
) (   )] 1 /( 1 [
~
  t t t t w p l l θ α + − − + =      (3) 
where  0 ) 1 /( ) ln(
~
> − ≡ α α l ,    is the logarithm of the nominal wage,  is the log of price 
level in time t. The labour supply by workers is given by: 
t w   t p
0         ,   ) (        ≥ − + − = δ δ χ η t t
s
t p w l         (4) 
where the intercept term in (4) is not set equal to that of the demand for labour because we 
assume that the labour supply is affected by distortions in the labour market, captured by the 
parameter  ) 0 ( > χ χ . Equating (3) and (4) under the assumption that  0 = δ , without any loss 
of generality of our results, we obtain: 
  ) 1 ( ~   χ α υ − + + = t t t p w       (5) 
where   is the competitive equilibrium nominal wage in the labour market that would arise 
in the absence of nominal wage contracts and leads to the following competitive equilibrium 
output level: 
w ~
  , ~ ˆ   t t k y y υ + − = where  αη = y ~  and   αχ = k . Once wage contracts are signed at 
the beginning of each period, employment becomes demand determined. Thus, a moral 
hazard problem arise, justifying the incentive of workers to index their nominal wages to 
unexpected price movements (Gray, 1976) following the indexing rule: 
    1 0         ,   ) ( ~   1 1 ≤ ≤ − + = − − γ γ t t t t t t p E p w E w                 (6) 
                                                                                    6Equation (6) says that the nominal wage is an average of the expected  competitive 
equilibrium nominal wage, , and the unanticipated rise in prices, w ~
t t t p E p 1 − − , which reduces 
the real wage and causes firms to employ more labour. Hence, according to the indexation 
degree, γ , which captures the flexibility (or inertia) in the labour market; both employment 
and output exhibit a deviation from their respective equilibrium. For  1 = γ , wages are fully 
indexed, for  0 = γ  they are not indexed and for 1 0 > >γ  they are partially indexed. Finally, 
substituting equation (6) into (3) and using (1), we obtain the following aggregate supply 
function: 
          ) 1 ( ] )[ 1 ( ~   1 1 t t t t t t E k y y ε φθ ξ π π γ ξ + + + − − + − = − −              (7) 
where ) ( 1 − − ≡ t t t p p π  is the inflation rate, ) ( 1 1 1 − − − − ≡ t t t t t p p E E π  is the expected inflation 
rate and  ) 1 /( α α ξ − = .  
The government is assumed to minimize a loss function shared by society and defined 
over inflation and output. In other words, government dislikes deviations from both its 
inflation target,  (assumed to be zero for simplicity) and its output target,   (expressed in 
percentage points above natural output:  ). Since the government has no 
credible commitment technology available, it selects a more “conservative” central banker 
about inflation than the government (Rogoff, 1985), which is assumed to minimize the 
following loss function: 
∗ π
∗ y
0 ˆ > + =
∗ k y y t t














,                  (8) 
where the parameter λ   ) 0 ( > λ  denotes the relative importance (preference) that government 
places on the output target and the inflation target.β  ( ∞ < < β   0    ) is the degree of central 
bank independence or the central banker conservativeness. 
                                                                                    7In the following, we consider a one-shot Nash equilibrium. The central banker sets his 
policy instrument  t π  in order to minimize the expected value of the loss function (8), taking 
t t E π 1 −  and  1 − t θ  as given, and after observing the current-period supply shock. Taking the first 
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The, assuming rational expectations of the private sector and solving for  t t E π 1 −  yields:  
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By substituting equation (10) into (9), the time-consistent rational expectations equilibrium 
inflation rate is readily found as: 
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Equation (11) reveals that the equilibrium inflation rate in each period is determined by three 
factors:  ) 1 /( ) 1 ( β γ λξ + − k
1 ( 1 /[ )
2 λξ β ε γ + + t
/( ) 1 ( 1
2 θ γ φ λξ − − t
is the permanent inflationary bias due to the discretionary policy, 
 is the inflation due to output stabilization in the present 
period and   is the temporary inflationary bias due to past stabilization.  
] ) 1 (
2 2 γ λξ − −
) 1 β +
 
3. Price liberalization, CBI and inflation persistence 
 
This section examines the influence of price liberalization on the inflation persistence as well 
as the interaction between the process of liberalisation and the CBI. The inflation persistence 
may be easily calculated by the correlation coefficient ρ  between  t π  and  1 − t π , as follows: 
    ) ( Var / ) , ( Cov 1 t t t π π π ρ − =                  (12)  
 
                                                                                    8To determine the variance of  t π  and the covariance of  t π and  1 − t π , the unconditional mean 
of the inflation rate, π , can be written as: 








) 1 ( k
                                     (13) 
where a higher degree of central bank independence (a higher value of the parameterβ ) 
reduces the average inflation rate. Using equations (11) and (13), the unconditional variance 
of the inflation rate amounts to: 
2 2 2
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where  c .  1 ] ) 1 ( 1 [   / ) 1 (
2 2 2 2 ≤ − + + + ≡ γ λξ β β
To obtain the covariance of the inflation rates  t π  and  1 − t π , we use equation (11) for 
the period t  and, from equation (2), the fact that  1 − 1 − 1 − 2 − − = t t t ε θ φθ . Finally, assuming that 
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From equations (13), (15) and (16), follows the correlation coefficient between  t π  and  1 − t π  
or inflation persistence,ρ , as: 
             0








                     (16) 
Taking two boundary cases, we find that when productivity shocks are not persistent at all 
( 0 = φ ), the degree of inflation persistence ρ is also equal to zero. In the opposite, when 
1 = φ , the inflation persistence ρ becomes equal to one. Finally, under condition φ ) 1 ( c c − ≥ , 
we obtain 1 ≤ ρ . We note that this condition is necessary in order to insure a correlation 
                                                           
2 Note that the unconditional mean of  1 − t π is also equal to π . 
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proposition can be established. 
Proposition 1: The inflation persistence (indicated by parameterρ ) is negatively related 
with the decontrol (or liberalization) of domestic prices that is essential to the process 
of adjustment in internal goods market.  
Proof:  Using equation (16) and the condition  φ ) 1 ( c c − ≥ , we obtain a positive relation 
between the parameterρ , indicating the degree of inflation persistence, and the 
parameter φ , indicating the degree of adjustment in domestic goods market: 
         0  
)] 1 ( [
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Proposition 2: The degree of inflation persistence is negatively related with the degree 
of the nominal wage indexation and hence the degree of flexibility in labour market 
(indicated by parameterγ ).  
Proof:  Starting fromc , we easily obtain: 
2 2 2 2 ] ) 1 ( 1 [   / ) 1 ( γ λξ β β − + + + ≡
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] ) 1 ( 1 [














         Then, taking from (17) the first derivative of  ρ  with respect to  , we get:   c
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                                                                                    10We ask then whether central bank independence increases or reduces the impact of the 
process of domestic price liberalization on the inflation persistence ρ  (that is, a reduction in 
parameterφ ).  In this respect, we can establish the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: An increase of the degree of central bank independence increases the effect 
of the process of domestic price liberalization on the inflation persistence.  
Proof:  Taking the first derivative of   with respect to  c β , it comes that: 
0
] ) 1 ( 1 [
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It is clear in this graph that if Central Bank’s reform is introduced once the process of 
liberalization has begun, the economy will switch from the curve with a high degree of 
inflation persistence to those characterized by a lower value of ρ . 
 
4. The Econometric Methodology and empirical results  
 
4.1. Methodology and data  
In this section, we take a deeper look at the potential existence of an interaction between 
independence of central bank and sustained liberalization.  The reduced form of inflation 
dynamics equation:  t t t ε ρπ π + = −1  provides the theoretical framework for testing 
                                                                                    11empirically in this section whether the process of liberalization has affected the central bank 
independence reform to become more effective in reducing the inflation persistence in 
transition economies. The testing hypothesis indicates that change in inflation persistence 
affects significantly the coefficient on lagged inflation in the equation  t t t ε ρπ π + = −1 . We 
also allow for shifts on the constant term to capture the effect on the mean inflation rate. The 
dates of the shifts in the coefficients indicate the change in the policy regime. To prevent 
ourselves from possible subjective break date specification, we adopt a framework, which 
detects multiple coefficients shifts determined by the data. This framework is based upon 
earlier work carried out by Perron (1989), Perron and Vogelsang (1992) , Zivot and Andrews 
(1992) and Perron (1997). According to this framework, the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
set against the stationarity about a single broken line for alternative equation specifications. 
Details of model specifications are found in Perron (1989,1997) and for the exposition of our 
results we will briefly refer to them. The first model is called “innovational outlier model 1” 
and it has the form:  
yD U t D T yc y tt b t t i
i
k
ti t =+ + + + + + −
=
− ∑ µθ β δ α () 1
1
∆ e   (21) 
where  µ  is a constant, α measures inflation persistence, t is a time trend, the dummy DU 
captures the effect on inflation when the break occurs (the innovation term) and the dummy 
 captures shifts in inflation persistence. The term   corresponds to the 
number of additional lagged regressors of the first differenced dependent variable included to 
remove serial correlation.  The unit root test is performed using the t-statistic for testing 







α =1 in the above equation. This model allows only a change in the intercept under both the 
null and alternative hypotheses. The second model is called “innovational outlier model 2” 
and it has the form of equation: 
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i
k
ti t =+ + + + + + + −
=
− ∑ µθ β γ δ α () 1
1
∆ e   (22) 
where the dummy  captures the change in slope. The unit root test is performed using 
the t-statistic for testing 
) (T D
α =1 in the above equation. This model allows changes in the 
intercept and the slope under both the null and alternative hypotheses. Finally, the third 
model allows for the changes in slope but both segments of the trend function are joined at 
the time break. This is called the “additive outlier model”, described by the following 
equations: 
ytt tD Ty =+ + + µβ γ * ~
t
e
  (23a) 
and 
~~ ~ yy c y tt i
i
k
ti t =+ + −
=
− ∑ α 1
1
∆   (23b) 
 
The Unit Root test  1 = α  is performed on equation (23b) using the t-statistic. In all equations, 
Tb and k are treated as unknown. The methods of choosing the proper break dates and k are 
described in Perron (1997). We employ the procedure written by Colletaz and Serranito 
(1998) for Rats as developed by Doan (1997), to identify Tb and k.  
 
4.2. Data and empirical measures 
The empirical testing focuses on the phase of the restructuring in the FSE transition countries 
from centrally planned economies to market-oriented economies and the sample period is 
chosen according to the data availability. Monthly data for seven FSE transition economies 
(Chech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia) are obtained 
from IMS CD-ROM. Over the past 15 years, all these countries created completely new 
Central Bank laws, or reformed existing laws, at least once and sometime twice (Cukierman 
                                                                                    13et al., 2002). Table 1 presents highest inflation rates experienced in these countries, dates of 
stabilizations attempts, and changes in central bank laws. 
  






Dates of maximum 






Dates of New  
Central Bank laws  
and major amendments 
 
Czech Republic  1991 (52%)  January 1991  December 1992 
Estonia   1992 (954%)  January 1992  Mars 1990, May 1993 (CBI upgraded) 
Hungary  1990 (33%)  Mars 1990  October1991, January 1997 (CBI upgraded) 
Latvia   1992 (959%)  June 1992  Mars 1990, May 1992 (CBI upgraded) 
Lithuania     1992 (1161%)  June 1992  February 1990, Mars 1996 (CBI upgraded) 
Poland  1990 (90%)  January 1990  January 1989, February 1992 (CBI 
upgraded), August 1997 (CBI upgraded) 
Slovak Republic  1991 (58%)  January 1991  December 1992 (CBI reduced) 
   Source: Fischer, S., Sahay, R. and Vegh, C. (1996), IMF (1998), Lybeck (1999), Maliszewski (2000) 
 
In all countries the new CB laws contain at least basic provisions for Central Bank 
Independence (CBI) and the average level of independence is high.  In all these countries the 
new CB laws contain at least basic provisions for CBI and the average level of independence 
is high. For instance, five countries in the group (Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Chech Republic 
and Latvia) have higher or equal legal independence than the Bundensbank in the original 
GMT index. Political independence is high in Latvia, Chech Republic, Lithuania and 
Hungary. Economic independence is high in countries that adopted currency board 
arrangements: Lithuania and Estonia.  
Furthermore, four countries (Chech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) stabilized 
their economies at the start of the CB laws reform process. In this group CB laws were 
amended in Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the five countries experiencing 
relatively high and persistent inflation. CB laws reform were often introduced just prior to, or 
concurrently with price liberalization in internal and external markets included in these 
                                                                                    14stabilization programs. It is likely that in such cases CBI cannot offset the temporary impact 
of price decontrol on the measured rate of inflation. Even if substantial, CBI alone is 
insufficient to contain the, temporary but powerful, price level adjustment that are essential to 
the process of liberalization of internal prices. Table 2 presents the cumulative liberalization 
index experienced in these countries. 
 






















Czech Republic  0  0.16 0.95 1.84 2.74  3.64  4.57  5.5  6.43 
Estonia  0.07 0.27 0.59 1.23 2.04  2.93  3.86 4.79 5.72 
Hungary  0.34 0.91 1.65 2.43 3.25  4.11  5.01 5.91 6.84 
Latvia  0.04 0.17 0.46 0.97 1.64  2.45  3.26 4.11  5.0 
Lithuania  0.04  0.17 0.5 1.05 1.83 2.72 3.61 4.5 5.39 
Poland  0.24 0.92 1.64 2.46 3.28  4.14  5.03 5.92 6.81 
Slovak Republic  0  0.16 0.95 1.81 2.64  3.47  4.33 5.19 6.05 
      Source : deMelo et al. (1996) , Cukierman et al. (2002) 
 
4.2. The empirical results 
In the following, we study whether the CBI (identified by the dates of Central Bank laws 
reform and their major amendments in Table1) and the process of price liberalization, 
(included in stabilization programs in Table 1 and identified by the cumulative liberalization 
index in Table 2) did have any effect on inflation by protecting transition economies from 
inflation persistence consequences of the powerful inflationary shocks experienced at the 
early stage of transition. We examine also whether the CBI is negatively related to inflation 
persistence only at a sufficiently high and sustained level of economic liberalization, as 
argued by Cukierman et al. (2002) using cross-country data. The empirical results for the 
respective models are reported in Table 3. 
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Estimated equation :    yD U t D T yc y tt b t t i
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k
ti t =+ + + + + + −
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 For the case of Czech Republic, a significant change in the mean inflation and a shift in 
inflation persistence occur in 1997:04. This break point doesn’t seem to be correlated with 
the date of the CB law reform and the introduction of CBI in this country (December 1992). 
However, this break point seems to be correlated with a sufficient and sustained process of 
price liberalization in this country (1997: the sixth year of price liberalization). For the case 
of Estonia, we find a break in the inflation rate in 1996:08, which can be identified with the 
fifth year of a persistent process of price liberalization (1996) included in its stabilization 
program started at June 1992. However, the dates of the initial CB law reform (Mars 1990) 
and its major amendment upgrading CBI (May 1993) do not seem to be correlated with the 
detected break point at 1996:08. For the case of Hungary, the break point is identified in 
1994:07 and corresponds to the fourth year of a sustained process of price liberalization in 
this country (1994) started with its stabilization program in Mars 1990. However, the dates of 
                                                                                    16the initial CB law reform (October 1991) and the major amendment upgrading CBI (January 
1997) do not seem to be correlated with the detected break point at 1994:07. In the cases, of 
Latvia and Lithuania, the break points are detected respectively in 1995:12 and 1996:07 and 
correspond to the fourth year of their process of price liberalization started with their 
stabilization programs in June 1992. The dates of the initial CB law reform (Mars 1990 and 
February 1990 respectively) do not seem to be correlated with the detected break point. 
Concerning the first major amendment upgrading CBI (May1992 for Latvia and Mars 1996 
for Lithuania) seems to be correlated with the detected break point in Lithuania. Thus only in 
the case of Lithuania the break point in inflation persistence coincides with the second and 
last CB law enacted at 1996. For the case of Poland the data reveal a break point in 1995:03. 
This break point does not coincide with the first (January 1989), the second (February 1992) 
and the third (August 1997) CB laws reform and the CBI upgrading. However, this break 
point in inflation persistence seems to be correlated with the sixth year of a sustained process 
of price liberalization, started with its stabilization program in January 1990. Finally, for the 
case of Slovak Republic, the break point is identified in 1999:05 and corresponds to the 
seventh year of a process of price liberalization in this country, started with its stabilization 
program in January 1991. Similarly, the date of the CB law reform (December 1992) 
reducing the CBI does not seem to be correlated with the detected break point in inflation 
persistence. 
In all cases discussed above, the changes in CB law were motivated by policy makers’ 
increasing aversion to inflation and their attempts to establish anti-inflationary credibility. 
However, the general picture that emerges from the results reported in Table 3 leads to the 
conclusion that the process of decontrol of domestic prices (or process of price liberalization) 
has a significant positive impact on inflation persistence in transition countries and that, in 
the presence of controls, there is no evidence to support conventional wisdom regarding the 
                                                                                    17negative relation between CBI and inflation persistence.  A possible reason for the second 
conclusion is that such CBI is instrumental in reducing inflation persistence only when other 
structural features of the economy, such as the price liberalization, have become sufficiently 
and persistently similar to those of developed market economies.  
 
5.      Conclusions 
In this paper we study the question whether CBI is an appropriate monetary institution 
for transition economies to change inflation dynamics and foster the transition process to a 
stable and efficient market economy. Indeed, all transition economies passed through a 
period of very high inflation, and economic theory suggests that CBI can protect an economy 
from excessive monetary expansion, facilitating the stabilisation process and protecting 
economy from inflationary bias. In this respect, we provide theoretical arguments and find 
empirical evidence on the relation between CBI, price liberalization and inflation persistence. 
The empirical approach used to determine the most likely date for the change in regime was 
based on Perron (1997), where the null hypothesis of a unit root is set against the alternative 
of stationarity about a single broken trend. The general picture that emerges from the 
empirical results leads to the conclusion that the process of decontrol of domestic prices (or 
process of price liberalization) has a significant positive impact on inflation persistence in 
transition countries and that, in the presence of controls, there is no evidence to support 
conventional wisdom regarding the negative relation between CBI and inflation persistence.  
A possible reason for the second conclusion is that such CBI is instrumental in reducing 
inflation persistence only when other structural features of the economy, such as the price 
liberalization, have become sufficiently and persistently similar to those of developed market 
economies. Consequently, in a period of severe macroeconomic imbalances, CBI may not be 
an institutional arrangement effective enough to stabilize the economy. 
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